Journal of Comparative Business and Capital Market Law 8 (1986) 219-248
North-Holland

219

OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REGULATION

Christian J. MEIER-SCHATZ *

This Article explores the objectives of financial disclosure regulation as they have evolved in the
legislative history and academic debate of the United States, Switzerland, and Germany The Article
reviews traditional purposes such as investor protection, market efficiency and corporate governance,
as well as broader public policy considerations. Bv paying particular attention to characteristic
elements of national corporate and financial sectors, and to national regulatoiv models, the study
attempts a first step toward an "integrated" view of the objectives of financial disclosure rules.

1. Introduction
Problems of corporate financial disclosure and its governmental regulation
are widely and vigorously discussed in the United States as well as in
European countries, yet the focus of the debates seems to move in different
directions. U.S. economists and, more recently, legal commentators have
increasingly challenged the theoretical foundation of the U.S. securities act's
disclosure scheme [1]. Their broadened attack even may have had its impact
on the regulatory process itself [2]. This widespread academic criticism has, on
the whole, no equal in the European discourse [3]. Regulators in Europe,
stimulated partly by the EEC's efforts to harmonize the corporate laws of its
members [4], still tend to tighten up their rules on corporate information.
As far as their regulatory objectives are concerned, financial disclosure
requirements in the U.S. and European countries differ in remarkable ways [5].
The most significant difference results from the broader range of public policy
goals underlying the European acts. While the U.S. disclosure acts have
addressed the needs of investors and capital markets exclusively, European
rules often reveal a concern for other corporate constituencies, in particular,
creditors and employees, and for the general public. The discrepancies between various disclosure laws, however, decrease gradually when analyzed
within a narrower shareholder and market-oriented perspective. U.S. and
European regulators alike have considered fairness and corporate governance
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related aspects, with the intention of enhancing the efficiency of their national
securities markets [6].
Since countless studies have already been made comparing U.S. and
European disclosure rules [7], this Article has another aim. It attempts to take
a first step toward an "integrated" view of the regulatory objectives of
financial disclosure regulation by assessing, from a transnational point of
view, the theoretical debate on mandatory disclosure rules. For this reason, it
will investigate the comparative empirical and logical support for the various
objectives of disclosure requirements. Due to the constraints of space, U.S.
disclosure regulation and academic criticism of it will be contrasted with
disclosure principles of only two European countries, Germany and Switzerland. Furthermore, an inquiry is made into the extent to which the arguments
depend upon particular institutional features of national corporate and financial sectors and upon national governmental regulatory models. Both inquiries
may also allow some general insights into the operation and effectiveness of
corporate financial disclosure as a regulatory tool.
At the same time, this Article will examine the broad range of objectives of
disclosure rules as they evolved under a historical and theoretical perspective.
Thus, in Section 2, it will examine investor, shareholder, and capital market
oriented goals with respect to the familiar legislative concerns for investor
protection, market efficiency, and corporate governance. In Section 3, it will
review broader public policy objectives by asking which role financial disclosure rules may play in connection with informing the general public and
creditors and employees, respectively, as specific corporate constituencies. In
Section 4, the Article concludes with some tentative hypotheses and a summary
of its major findings.

2. Investor-, Shareholder-, and Capital Market-Oriented Objectives
2.1. Protectionof Investors
2.1.1. Investor Protection as a Policy Goalfor DisclosureRules
One may ask if the investor is an appropriate subject of legislative concern
under a social policy perspective. The question has been answered in the
negative by some commentators, particularly with respect to disclosure regulation for investments chosen by affluent and experienced investors [8]. In
modern capital markets, however, a large majority of investment forms seem
to be open (directly or indirectly) to smaller investors in a position akin to
consumers needing governmental protection [9]. Moreover, capital markets
play an important role under a social policy inquiry because they absorb
substantial amounts of the "average!' investors' private savings [10].
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Although investor protection may be, therefore, a legitimate policy goal,
protective objectives are apparently of a minor and decreasing significance in
the modern discussion of financial disclosure regulation. Germany and
Switzerland only recently have enacted indirect legislative protection of investors' interests in their corporate laws [111. Academic comments on the regulation of capital markets recognize protective considerations, but are often
cautious as to a precise articulation of the policy objective [12]. The U.S.
practice and debate move in a similar direction. Some commentators even
have questioned whether investor protection was historically a real concern of
legislators enacting the securities laws [13]. The SEC itself has made an
important shift away from a fairness- and towards an efficiency-oriented
disclosure concept [14]. This emphasis on information rather than protection
of investors was overwhelmingly welcomed in the academic community [15].
In view of the decline in importance of investor-protection as a goal of
disclosure rules, three issues must be addressed in order to determine whether
policymaking should concern itself at all with investor protection. First, one
must inquire whether disclosure rules actually affect fraudulent practices in
the securities field. Secondly, one must ask whether investor protection is an
adequate standard for disclosure rules. Thirdly, one must ask whether disclosure requirements are always an adequate regulatory tool to protect individual investors.
2.1.2. Reduction of FraudulentPracticesby Disclosure Rules
Although there is no general definition of the investor protection objective,
the most common definition states that "investor protection" aims at the
deterrence of fraud on small and uninformed investors [16]. These investors
are especially regarded as needing protection from fraudulent practices in
connection with the issuance of new securities [17].
Whether disclosure rules are the proper device for preventing such fraud
has always been hard to conclusively demonstrate. This is so not only because
protective disclosure operates only indirectly to achieve its purpose [18], but
also because fraud undeniably continues to occur even with established
mandatory disclosure schemes [19]. Nonetheless, a series of U.S. studies
conducted by governmental agencies between 1941 and 1980 shows that
fraudulent actions have occurred much more frequently in connection with
issuers not covered by mandatory disclosure requirements [20]. The studies
also indicate that more effective disclosure rules would have made the execution of the fraudulent schemes very difficult, if not impossible [21]. In
addition, practical experience seems to suggest that some fraudulent conduct
simply does not get off the ground because of the existence of a mandatory
disclosure process [22]. Both empirical results and experience support the
thesis that the financial disclosure regulation of new securities issues can
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reduce although not prevent fraudulent practices detrimental to small investors.
2.1.3. Investor Protectionas a Standardfor Disclosure Rules
The traditional investor-protection oriented concept assumes that because
"average" investors are actively involved in the interpretation of financial
data, mandatory disclosure rules accordingly should be tailored to these
recipients [23]. It is, however, an accepted truth that this model of the
informed layman is largely an ideological fiction [24]. The "active investor"
model is inconsistent not only with the working of real investment processes
but also with the very structure of disclosure regulations in organized capital
markets [25]. Modern theories of -finance, furthermore, suggest that prices in
organized capital markets reflect a large amount of publicly available information [26]. The arguments are convincing that small investors can take a free
ride on the information produced by the market, and that market prices are
remarkably effective protection instruments [27]. More importantly, the informational function performed by disclosure rules may be impaired by a
protectively oriented disclosure standard. For instance, the SEC has, for a long
time, prohibited the disclosure of forward-looking information, stressing its
misleading nature for small investors and thereby precluding the availability of
important information for investment decisions [28].
One caveat remains with respect to a disclosure scheme that addresses
"average" investors. In not-organized capital markets, which are still of a
major economic significance in European countries, small investors cannot
rely on market prices as a device for consumer protection [29]. Although this
shortcoming can be offset by the use of professional advisors analyzing
technical financial data [30], a large and reliable investment advice system may
not be available in every securities market. Under such conditions, the
argument for disclosure rules tailored to the needs of small investors becomes
more tenable [31].
2.1.4. Investor Protection by Disclosure Concepts
Even with respect to not-organized capital markets, however, the effectiveness of investor protective disclosure regulations is debated. Since the early
days of U.S. federal securities regulation, there have been supporters of a
market control scheme beyond mere information rules, emphasizing that
disclosure is not ideally suited to guarding small investors [32]. This argument
has almost been forgotten in the modem American system focused on corporate disclosure in highly organized national markets. But it is interesting to
note that it has, in some ways, reappeared in the European debate on
regulation of not-organized capital markets. Critics of the German proposal
for a new investment act [33], for instance, questioned a regulatory approach
based primarily on mandatory disclosure rules, arguing that it would not
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provide sufficient protection of investors [34]. Their postulate for substantive
corporate law provisions seems convincing [35]. Thus, substantial doubt exists
whether traditional financial disclosure is an effective regulatory device for the
protection of investors in not-organized capital markets [36].
2.2. Promotion of Efficiency
2.2.1. Promotion of Efficiency as a Policy Goalfor Disclosure Rules
Efficiency-based policy rationales for disclosure rules aim to strengthen the
functioning of the market as an economic institution. In view of the social and
economic benefits produced by capital markets [37], the promotion of their
efficiency is, in European countries as well as in the U.S., an undisputed policy
goal [38]. The only controversy is whether governmental regulation promotes
greater efficiency.
Capital markets often are analyzed under the separate aspects of institutional, operational, and allocational efficiency [39]. Although there may be a
positive correlation between disclosure regulation and operational efficiency
[40], this section focuses on the most significant principle, allocational efficiency. Under that principle, mandatory financial disclosure is believed
desirable because more accurate in-vestment decisions by informed investors
should lead to more efficient allocation of capital resources [41]. The efficiency-related objective of disclosure rules, however, has been seriously questioned, in particular by U.S. economists. The first of the following three
sections reviews briefly the empirical counter-evidence of U.S. economists. The
second and third sections try to determine whether any theoretical arguments
in favor of a mandatory disclosure concept remain tenable under the modern
theory of finance [42].
2.2.2. The Empirical Evidence
In the last two decades, influential U.S. economists have conducted a series
of quantitative empirical studies based on modem methods of security price
research. These economists have concluded that the disclosure rules of the
securities acts had no significant beneficial impact on capital markets [43].
Yet, such findings are not determinative. Security price research itself
apparently has inherent limits in connection with the evaluation of mandatory
disclosure rules. As Professor Beaver puts it, "In sum, the absence of price
effects is not necessarily an indictment of a regulation, and the presence of
price effects is not sufficient to confirm the value of the regulation" [44].
Specifically, the U.S. empirical studies were not apt to detect benefits for the
investor because they relied on statistical figures of returns [45]. Insofar as
they compare the pre- and post-1933/34 markets, another flaw of the findings
lies in the fact that the institutional structures of capital markets have
considerably changed since the enactment of the securities acts [46]. These and

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

C.J. Meier-Schatz / Objectives offinancial disclosure regulation

other problems of empirical tests led two prominent commentators to the
conclusion that "there may not be any accurate method to ascertain the gross
benefits of mandatory disclosure today other than by abandoning some or all
of the disclosure system and observing the long-term effects..." [47].
2.2.3. Market Efficiency and Disclosure Regulation
The most prominent theoretical framework under which to analyze corporate disclosure is the modem theory of finance. Among other things, this
theory postulates the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH), which
asserts in a semi-strong form that capital markets are perfectly efficient in the
sense that they reflect all available public information to the point of anticipating new information prior to its public announcement and dissemination
[481. At face value, the ECMH contradicts the allegation that beneficial effects
result from mandatory disclosure rules on allocational market efficiency. That
is, because significant information is instantly and continuously reflected in
market prices, regulation of financial disclosure may be seen as superfluous
[49].
As with any hypothesis of economic theory [50], though, one must caution
against acceptipg wholesale the direct regulatory implications of the ECMH
[51]. Professor Beaver may be right in surmising that "the concept of market
efficiency by itself is not sufficiently rich to warrant inferences regarding
institutional structure" [52]. The ECMH, for example, does not measure the
peculiar economic and social value of mandatory disclosure rules [53]. Assessment of those values in regard to efficiency requires a consideration of factors
other than the amount and speed of the information's reflection in market
prices.
It has been stressed repeatedly that even in the U.S., only about ten percent
of the corporations registered under the Securities Exchange Act are regularly
followed by analysts, and for the remaining ninety percent, the market is
presumably less efficient [54]. It is important to recall that empirical studies of
market efficiency rely largely on the New York Stock Exchange. Whether their
efficiency assessments can be generalized for other "sub-markets", in particular for the over-the-counter market and other stock exchanges, seems doubtful
[55]. Insofar as these sub-markets are less efficient, governmental disclosure
requirements may improve the allocation of capital resources, because public
information does not always reach them in advance of the mandatory disclosure data [56]. This beneficial effect on resource allocation is even more
significant in the European markets. German and Swiss commentators generally agree that the stock exchanges in their countries do not show an efficiency
comparable to that of the U.S. stock markets [57]. The relatively few empirical
tests indicate that these markets cannot anticipate all of the available information [58]. The contrast with U.S. markets is even more striking for Europe's
not-organized capital markets, which are, by definition, not efficient [59]. At
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least for Germany and Switzerland, the conclusion seems unavoidable that
mandatory disclosure rules can supply the capital markets with new information and enhance their allocational efficiency [60].
2.2.4. Disclosure Regulation in Efficient Markets
Even within efficient capital market segments, disclosure regulation may
have beneficial effects. One must recognize, for instance, that securities
information has hybrid characteristics and is at least partly a public good [61].
It is well known in the economic theory of externalities that public goods tend
to be underproduced because producers are unable to charge all potential
users and beneficiaries of the goods [62]. One can identify, therefore, a lack of
private profit incentives to provide the socially desirable amount of securities
information [63]. In particular, information intermediaries (especially analysts)
do not engage in enough search activity to fill the gap between information
desired and information provided. This problem could be alleviated by
mandatory disclosure rules. The disclosure rules would reduce the cost for
intermediaries, which would result in an increase in the aggregate amount of
securities research [64].
The production of information by investors and intermediaries may be
viewed as redundant, to the extent that these groups gather the same sets of
information [65]. Disclosure regulation, by making securities data publicly
available would not only prevent these groups from developing too little, but
also from undertaking too much informational activity. By creating a central
information repository, governmental regulation would reduce wasteful duplication of search activities [66]. Mandatory disclosure requirements, therefore,
may be regarded as a regulatory alternative that provides corporate data "at a
lower cost than would be incurred by the private sector's information network
in seeking the same information and reflecting it in prices" [67].
Disclosure regulation also may reduce the overall costs of information
search and analysis because it requires all corporations to publish standard
financial statements [68]. This allows investors and intermediaries to analyze
securities data more quickly and less expensively. At the same time, the
aggregate informational value of essentially standardized and therefore comparable financial statements seems to be higher [69]. Moreover, mandatory
disclosure rules may neutralize the negative external effects any publication of
internal information can cause [70]. As long as all corporations must "disclose
financial.., data, none would get an unfair advantage on balance" [71].
Even though disclosure regulation may have socially beneficial effects on
the information markets, the question remains whether its use can be justified
as well with respect to investment decisions of individual investors in efficient
markets. Under the modern theory of finance, the Portfolio Theory asserts
that investors may eliminate a great deal of the risks they assume when
acquiring individual securities by holding a diversified portfolio [72]. Yet, even
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though diversification may reduce investors' demand for firm-specific information 173], it does not necessarily follow that mandatory disclosure rules are
superfluous [741. As Professor Coffee recently has shown [75], mandatory
disclosure rules may benefit ordinary investors in two ways. First, because
most investors do not fully diversify their securities portfolios in order to hold
diversified investment portfolios, disclosure (primarily of line of business data)
enables them to minimize the variance in their overall investment portfolio by
purchasing negatively covariant securities [76]. Secondly, the disclosure of
financial information may be relevant for the investors' decisions concerning
portfolio revision since the information allows the investors to better estimate
the Beta values [77] of individual securities [78].
Another argument often made in connection with the governmental regulation of financial disclosure is the so-called "confirmation effect" [791. This
argument asserts that a higher quality, rather than higher quantity, of financial
information is produced under mandatory disclosure rules. Such a conclusion
is plausible because, even if mandatory disclosure rules do not provide new
information, they still can operate as a check on previously disseminated
corporate data [80]. That is, they can "serve ex ante to verify information
already released to market professionals through less formal channels" [81].
One last efficiency argument for mandatory disclosure played a major role
in the enactment of the U.S. securities acts. It was asserted that disclosure
regulation would enhance investors' confidence in capital markets [82]. Today
it is still widely held that capital formation, disclosure rules, and investor
confidence are closely interrelated [83]. The correlation is rooted in the
financial theory of risk aversion which states that an "investor who believes
the market is a fair game puts more in equities and spends less investigating"
[84]. The argument's persuasiveness depends on the ability of disclosure
requirements to make markets a fairer game. As previously shown, disclosure
rules do enhance fairness because they reduce fraudulent practices in capital
markets [85]. The investor confidence argument, then, stands at the crossroad
of efficiency and fairness considerations, indicating that a regulatory system
for protecting investors may, under certain circumstances, concomitantly
promote an efficient allocation of financial resources [86].
3. Promotion of Corporate Governance
3.1. Promotion of CorporateGovernance as a Policy Goalfor Disclosure Rules
The corporate governance objectives of financial disclosure regulation relate
to the institutional power structure of the modern corporation. They are aimed
at providing reliable monitoring of managers in the interest of shareholders.
Corporate governance as a policy objective is not disputed in either the U.S. or
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Europe [87]. Once more, opinions differ regarding the question of whether
(and which) regulatory intervention is required to attain the goal [88]. On a
very general level, American and European advocates of a mandatory disclosure scheme agree that it could improve the operation of the corporate
governance system [89]. There is considerable difference, however, with respect
to the precise function financial disclosure regulation is thought to serve.
3.2. Promotion of Shareholder Voting
Assuming for the purposes of this article that shareholder participation is a
desirable goal, it is difficult to dispute that the dissemination of corporate data
promotes both a more frequent and effective use of the shareholder franchise.
Disclosure rules have a beneficial impact on voting rights because better
informed shareholders are supposed to make more intelligent voting decisions
[90]. Yet, financial disclosure regulations do not enhance all aspects of the
shareholder franchise. On the one hand, financial information is clearly
material to shareholders when fundamental corporate changes or other matters
of financial significance must be voted on [91]. On the other hand, although
European commentators hold otherwise [92], financial data seems of dubious
relevance to shareholders making board elections. While it is true, as discussed
in the following section, that financial statements may give some indications of
management's performance [93], they do not disclose the kind of information
shareholders need the most in order to make a diligent choice of corporate
directors [94]. More helpful would be information about individual members,
composition, structure, and functioning of the board [95].
Financial disclosure regulation serves a peculiar function in European stock
company laws because shareholders there vote on the distribution of corporate
benefits [96]. It is obvious that financial data are indispensable for dividend
decisions [97]. But the European disclosure rules in this context do not simply
protect shareholders' individual dividend rights. Because the reallocation of
internal capital resources is at stake, they have an equally important impact on
the allocational function of capital markets [98]. When informed shareholders
vote for a distribution of benefits, they increase the portion of the total capital
formation which is allocated by the external capital markets [99].
3.3. Promotion of Management Monitoring
In support of disclosure rules, European commentators traditionally have
pointed out a relationship between financial disclosure rules and the direct
control of managements performance by shareholders [100]. The argument is
certainly plausible that financial statements provide data which are useful to
evaluate the corporation's and, therefore, management's success. But the direct
monitoring effect should not be overestimated [101]. Financial statements, for
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structural reasons, do not include all the information necessary to assess how
management has run the corporation [102]. Moreover, it is difficult for
individual shareholders to determine the contribution of management or even
specific corporate officers to overall corporate performance by examining
figures on financial statements [103].
Mandatory financial disclosure rules may play a more prominent role in
enhancing two control devices which indirectly operate in the interest of
shareholders. In the first case, the capital market improves the performance of
managers because low stock prices threaten managers' often substantial personal interests in the corporation's stock and the corporation's ability to raise
new capital [104]. In the second case, the market for corporate control
stimulates better performance because low stock prices encourage outsiders to
seek control. In the belief that they can run the corporation more efficiently,
outsiders attempt to acquire the corporation and to replace the incompetent
managers [105]. Financial disclosure regulation enhances the effectiveness of
both of these indirect disciplinary mechanisms. In that they lead to more
accurate stock prices [106], the requirements concomitantly improve the function of stock prices as a monitoring instrument [107]. Mandatory disclosure
requirements are also particularly important in tender offer situations because
they reduce management's inclination to manipulate information for its own
benefit in a battle for corporate control [108]. In European countries, however,
their importance to tender offer situations is less significant because tender
offers themselves are infrequently used in these countries for hostile takeovers

[109].
Another question is whether financial disclosure regulation not only helps
shareholders to monitor management performance, but also actually promotes
management's adherence to its fiduciary duty to shareholders, especially their
duty of loyalty [110]. The general ability of disclosure to deter self-dealing and
other questionable practices has been widely recognized in the U.S. as well as
in Europe [111]. Yet, opinions differ regarding the precise role financial
disclosure requirements play in this context. While American writers for the
most part explicitly or implicitly assert that only specific transaction related
information can prevent breaches of the duty of loyalty [112], the European
literature evinces a widespread belief that mandatory financial statements
secure a more responsible and less selfish management [113]. The European
position, however, seems untenable. Admittedly, disloyal behavior may be
indicated by financial data when the behavior affects the overall performance
of the corporation [114]. Financial disclosure regulation may also reduce
fraudulent practices in connection with the issue of new securities [115]. It is
doubtful, however, whether shareholders generally can detect questionable
management practices by analyzing financial statements [116]. Much more
useful for that purpose is mandatory information which relates directly to
management's integrity [117]. For the same reasons, financial disclosure regu-
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lation can hardly be expected to monitor loyalty violations in capital markets
and the market for corporate control. Both indirect control mechanisms are
ill-suited to sanction the self-dealing of management [118].
4. Broader Public Policy Objectives
4.1. Informing the GeneralPublic
4.1.1. Informing the General Public as a Policy Goalfor Disclosure Rules
The argument for informing the general public represents a broader policy
goal which correlates corporate disclosure with an informational need of the
public aside from the need of investors and shareholders. It has played a major
role in the historical development of, and the academic debate over, European
disclosure rules [119]. Generally, the argument is compelling that the general
public has a legitimate claim to be informed about large corporations having a
manifold impact on the economy and society [120]. Yet, it remains unclear
whether a reference to the interests of the general public is necessary to
provide a satisfactory disclosure regulation. To put it differently: why and
when are financial disclosure legislators induced to invoke a broader public
interest transcending investor, shareholder, and capital market based arguments?
The interest put forth by commentators as the general public's seems to be
a residual concept used to justify disclosure rules [121] when investor, shareholder, and capital market based concepts are unable to reach the socially
desirable coverage of business enterprises, in particular the disclosure of
financial data by large corporations. Whether this residual category is in fact
necessary to realize sufficient coverage of these larger enterprises depends
upon the institutional and legal structure of the national corporate sector and
upon the basic regulatory approaches of national disclosure rules. For instance,
U.S. registration rules trigger disclosure requirements for all corporations
which have exchange listed securities, and for all corporations which have a
class of equity securities with more than five hundred shareholders and more
than three million dollars in total assets [122]. The registration rules are, in
accordance with the general regulatory concept of the securities acts, basically
capital market oriented [123]. These rules are able to cover most enterprises
exceeding a certain size because most larger business entities are organized as
corporations, and their securities are either listed on exchanges or traded
among more than five hundred shareholders in the over-the-counter market
[124]. Hence, there is no immediate need to refer to broader public policy
considerations to realize the socially desirable coverage of mandatory financial
disclosure rules in the United States.
The situation looked quite different in Germany prior to the enactment of
the Publicity Law [125]. Big enterprises were under a disclosure obligation

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

C.J. Meier-Schatz / Objectives offinancial disclosure regulation

only as long as they were organized as stock companies [126]. Yet, of the
thousand largest industrial entities at that time, less than half were incorporated as stock companies [127]. The obviously insufficient coverage of large
enterprises caused the enactment of the Publicity Law [128]. Because an
investor, shareholder, and capital market based disclosure concept could not
justify expanding the disclosure requirements [129], the legislators had to
invoke the interest of a general public to reach their objective [130].
Switzerland experienced yet another situation. Large Swiss enterprises are
all incorporated as stock companies [131]. Partly because the vast majority of
smaller businesses organize as stock companies as well, the legislators did not
enact any mandatory disclosure requirements at all [132]. Without a fundamental shift of the regulatory approach, a reform aimed at mandatory disclosure rules for larger corporations cannot be founded on shareholder and
investor related arguments [133]. Insofar as capital market criteria do not
realize the desirable coverage, the legislators again have to refer to broader
public policy considerations.
This comparison leads to the conclusion that informing the general public
as a policy goal may be necessary to guarantee a satisfactory financial
disclosure regulation, especially with respect to an adequate inclusion of larger
enterprises. Two questions remain open and will be discussed briefly in the
following sections. The first question is whether interests of the general public
can justify requiring financial data different from that required by investors.
The second investigates the functions the disclosure rules for the general
public are thought to exercise.
4.1.2. Additional FinancialDatafor the GeneralPublic
Insofar as mandatory disclosure rules provide corporate data for shareholders and investors, the general public is informed as well and can take a
free ride on the information disseminated to others. Legislators, therefore, do
not need to refer to broader policy considerations to require the release of the
same information to a general public [134]. It does not follow, however, that
the general public's interest may not call for the dissemination of additional
financial data. The argument is conceivable that "shareholders might not
demand as much information as the public would wish, because shareholders
cannot capture the externality (a 'better run economy') the information
provides" [135].
It is doubtful that there are many situations in which the public's need for
financial [136] data could be higher than the investors' need. Capital market
and shareholder based disclosure and disclosure regulation, as the U.S. system
impressively shows, is so effective in producing a broad range of detailed
financial information that it is difficult to determine any substantial additional
demand required to benefit the public interest [1371. Moreover, the public,

insofar as it is thought to exercise specific functions in connection with
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corporate financial disclosure [138], seems to demand the same kind of
financial data as investors and shareholders for information and control
purposes. This conclusion is supported by Germany's experience with its
Publicity Law [139]. This legislation, clearly based on broader public policy
considerations, only requires disclosure of the same financial information that
is disseminated under shareholder and investor oriented stock company law
[140].
4.1.3. Functions of Disclosure Rules for the General Public
The question of what function financial disclosure rules serve for individuals outside the investor oriented information system, in particular the general
public, has been extensively discussed in European literature. The commentators allege three functions. First, financial disclosure requirements supply the
public with relevant data about the corporation (information function) [141].
Secondly, they enhance the public's knowledge of, and consequently its
confidence in, the corporate sector (confidence function) [142]. Finally, the
dissemination of financial data enables the public to evaluate corporations'
performances and to monitor management behavior (control function) [143].
The arguments supporting the significance of the first two functions,
information and confidence, clearly are persuasive. Disclosure regulation
ensures the dissemination to the public of financial information that is
probably otherwise unavailable. Moreover, it allows the representatives of the
public opinion, most notably the mass media, to promote discussion of the
data and to debate its issuers' performances [144]. A better informed public
would be less suspicious of individual interprises, especially large enterprises,
and the entire corporate sector. More confidence may be placed, therefore, in
the economy as a whole.
Doubts persist as to the third of the alleged functions, namely that financial
disclosure regulation would enable the general public to control corporate and
managerial activity. Disclosure, by its very nature, is not a direct but an
indirect monitoring technique [145]. Its effectiveness depends upon the existence of a reliable feedback mechanism [146]. Such a responsive structure is
institutionally implemented in information systems addressing investors,
shareholders, and capital markets. One must seriously question, however,
whether public opinion, even when set forth by the media and special interest
groups, effectively influences corporations and managers [147]. These doubts
are particularly significant because financial disclosure pertains to the economic performance of the corporation, which is not usually the area where the
social pressure of public opinion is likely to be generated [148]. A second
reservation exists concerning the inherent limitations of financial statements
for evaluating corporate management. Their monitoring effects as to management's performance are seriously limited [149]. Furthermore, one should recall
that financial disclosure regulation is ill-suited for deterring disloyal and
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unlawful managerial behavior [150]. The public is thus in no better position
than shareholders in the detection and prevention of ineffective and questionable practices of management through the reading of financial statements [151].
4.2. Information Needs of Other Constituencies
Another public policy objective of financial disclosure rules is to inform
corporate constituencies, other than investors and shareholders, that have
specific economic ties to the corporate entity. This objective has influenced the
European debate in which disclosure was often related to creditors' and
employees' "right to know" [152]. The next two sections will briefly review the
German and Swiss views on disclosure requirements as they are meant to serve
these two constituencies.
4.2.1. Informing Creditors
The question whether financial disclosure rules are or should be based on
creditors' informational demands is vigorously debated, particularly in
Germany [153]. The argument itself may have some force in that disclosure
regulation supplies creditors with information they need to evaluate the
debtors' economic situation and to assess their own risks [154]. There are,
however, two objections against such a creditor oriented justification for
disclosure requirements. First, it is asserted that creditors need not depend on
mandatory disclosure to protect their interests because they have contractual
alternatives. This is true for financial institutions and other larger creditors
with considerable bargaining power. Yet, smaller creditors are scarcely able to
inform themselves by means of contractual disclosure devices [155]. More
compelling is a second objection that creditor based arguments tend to cause
excessive coverage of the corporate sector by financial disclosure requirements.
It is indeed hard to see why creditors of enterprises which are subject to
mandatory disclosure rules should be in a better position than creditors of
unregulated business entities. A creditor protection oriented rationale, taken
seriously, would lead to the mandatory disclosure of everyone who is doing
business [156].
A reference to the creditors' demand for disclosure by debtors is irrelevant
when a capital market, investor, or shareholder related regulation provides the
financial information. Creditors may then play the role of a free rider. The
same is true if disclosure is required with respect to the interests of the general
public. On the whole, creditors apparently need similar financial data. Their
informational interest covers the basic particulars of the debtors' overall
economic situation and therefore parallels to a considerable extent the demand
of investors and shareholders [1571.
Proponents of a disclosure regulation scheme which focuses on the interests
of creditors assert that there are two functions served by mandatory require-
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ments [158]. First, they provide the information necessary to evaluate debtors'
financial condition and, secondly, they protect creditors from unexpected
insolvencies of their debtors. The informational rationale is conclusive. Small
creditors, especially, may receive information which is useful for an estimation
of the debtor's economic situation and which they cannot get otherwise. The
alleged prophylactic purpose, however, is more doubtful. Even if financial
statements were effective indicators of impending insolvencies, their ability to
protect all creditors would be uncertain [159]. Yet, more important is the fact
that financial statements are relatively crude and unreliable instruments from
which to predict insolvencies [160]. The prophylactic end of creditor based
disclosure rules seems therefore to be attainable only within specific limits.
4.2.2. Informing Employees
An employee's "right to know" in connection with financial disclosure
regulation is no less controversial than that of creditors [161]. On a general
level, there is a powerful argument that workers and their representatives have
a legitimate claim to be informed about their employers' economic situation
[162]. Nevertheless, two potential objections remain. First, employees may not
need corporate information because their interests are protected by the collective bargaining process between unions and employers [163]. A contractual
regulation of labor relations may provide more timely and specific information
to employees. On the other hand, mandatory disclosure rules can improve the
informational background of workers' representatives and thereby perfect the
collective bargaining process [164]. The second objection is that, like a creditor
related purpose, a strictly labor oriented rationale for disclosure rules should
include a general disclosure obligation for all business entities because there is
no compelling reason to prefer employees of enterprises subject to a mandatory information scheme [165].
In regard to the relevance and practical effect of labor based motives for
financial disclosure regulation, a reference can be made to what has been said
in connection with other, broader public policy objectives. Like creditors and
the general public, workers can take a free ride on information which is
disseminated for investors, shareholders, and capital markets [166]. Moreover,
employees generally need the same information because, as far as financial
disclosure is concerned [167], they are, like creditors and the general public,
mainly interested in the overall economic situation of their employers [168].
Advocates of a labor oriented disclosure regulation impute three functions
to disclosure rules [169]. They assert that a mandatory concept guarantees the
release of information about employers' financial situation, promotes confidence in the relationship between labor and employers [1701, and makes
employment more secure by protecting workers against sudden insolvencies
[171]. Once again the arguments advanced for the information and confidence
functions may be convincing. Disclosure regulation supplies workers and
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unions with detailed financial data about an employer's general economic
position and performance. In addition, better informed employees and labor
representatives may put their trust in the other bargaining party sooner.
Information requirements thereby can improve the bargaining mechanisms.
More doubtful is again the alleged prophylactic and protective purpose of
financial disclosure rules. They can scarcely provide the informational basis
for a reliable prediction of employers' insolvency and of other financial or
operational difficulties. "The probability that a company or any one of its
plants will offer continued employment at any given level.., cannot be
determined from financial statements" [172]. Workers and their representatives face the same limits as creditors in foreseeing financial and other
problems of corporations simply by interpreting financial statements [173].

5. Conclusion
This Article attempts a first step towards an "integrated" view of financial
disclosure regulation by analyzing, under a comparative perspective, the
objectives underlying different national disclosure rules and proposals in the
transnational academic debate. From the outset, the Article has ascribed a
particular significance to two aspects. The first related to characteristic elements of national corporate and financial sectors as well as national regulatory
models which may play a crucial role in estimating mandatory disclosure rules.
The second concerned the comparative evidence as to the five alleged purposes
of financial disclosure regulation.
It is neither new nor surprising that peculiar features of national enterprises, markets, and regulations considerably influence an evaluation of
mandatory disclosure rules. Two groups of factors may be distinguished. One
group refers to characteristics of national capital markets. It makes a significant difference if disclosure requirements address organized or not-organized
capital markets. It is also important to know whether capital markets and their
segments are "perfectly" efficient or not. The second group includes individual features of national corporate sectors and of their regulation. Of particular
importance are institutional and legal structures of specially large enterprises,
basic regulatory concepts of disclosure rules, and specific elements of corporate laws. When and why all these factors are relevant can best be recalled by
summarizing the results of the investigation of the objectives of mandatory
disclosure requirements.
Financial disclosure rules are beneficial to investors because they reduce
fraudulent practices in connection with the issuance of new securities. Nevertheless, investor protection is a dubious standard for disclosure rules in
organized capital markets because such a standard tends to impair the
informational function. Not-organized capital markets, as they chiefly exist in
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European countries, may require a shaping of disclosure requirements for
smaller investors. Yet, it remains debatable whether, under these market
conditions, a traditional disclosure concept is an effective regulatory tool to
protect the investor community.
It is clear that financial disclosure regulation promotes the efficiency of not
"perfectly" efficient capital markets because it supplies them with new information. This seems to be important for most of the European capital markets,
but possibly also relevant for some segments of the U.S. capital market.
Mandatory disclosure requirements have a beneficial impact even on efficient
capital markets. They improve the information market by increasing the
aggregate amount of securities research, by reducing wasteful duplication of
search activities, and by other advantageous effects related to the externalities
of corporate disclosure. Moreover, they can be helpful for individual investors
making specific portfolio decisions. Finally, they may provide a better quality
of information and promote capital formation by giving investors more
confidence in the capital markets.
Corporate governance based financial disclosure rules are probably not very
important for board elections, but remain meaningful when shareholders vote
on fundamental changes or other matters of financial significance. In addition,
such rules exercise a particular function in European corporate laws when
shareholders decide upon the distribution of dividends and thereby upon the
external market allocation of internal funds. Also, financial disclosure regulation plays a role in monitoring managerial activity. Although financial
statements have a limited value for direct management control by individual
shareholders, disclosure requirements can support market forces in serving as
indirect disciplinary mechanisms. However, purely financial information is not
well-suited for the monitoring of managers' loyalty.
A comparative analysis indicated that the interest of the general public is a
residual category for justifying mandatory disclosure and is put forth when
other objectives do not guarantee the socially desirable coverage of large
corporations by the mandatory disclosure scheme. For instance, the institutional and legal structure of their enterprises as well as the regulatory concept
of their disclosure rules prevented both Germany and Switzerland from
reaching all their larger enterprises by a disclosure scheme exclusively addressed to shareholders and investors. Insofar as disclosure regulation provides
corporate data for these traditional constituencies, the general public has
probably no need for much additional financial information. Disclosure rules
serving the general public may supply it with useful information and even
enhance its confidence towards corporations and the economy. But it remains
doubtful that the rules, as often alleged, facilitate the public's control of
enterprises and managers.
The public policy argument for informing creditors and employees faces the
fundamental problem that, taken to its logical extreme, the concept would
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demand mandatory disclosure requirements for all business entities. Creditors
and employees can take a free ride whenever information is mandated for
other corporate constituencies. Their demand for financial data is not fundamentally different from the demand of investors, shareholders, or the general
public. Disclosure rules drafted especially for creditors and employees may
serve informational purposes, but these two corporate constituencies can rely
on financial statements for prophylactic protection against insolvencies or

other major financial and operational difficulties of the debtors or employers
only within specific limits.
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[561 Cf. Barry, supra note 49, at 1350-51 (reaching a similar conclusion).
[57] See H. Reuter, supra note 3, at 167-68; Schmidt, supra note 3, at 747 n.66; Wagner,
supra note 3, at 759; cf. Pratt & Behr, Entvicklhng von Grundsiitzen der Rechnungslegung und
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Rechnmmgsprilfung, 55 SAG 72, 77-78 (1983) (discussing the structural differences between the
U.S. and Swiss capital markets).
[58] For the German tests, see H. Berndsen. Unternehmenspublizit-t - Eine empirisehe
Untersuchung zur Messung des Publizitiitsverhaltens grosser bbrsennotierten Aktiengesellschaften
und der Auswirkungen auf die Anlageentscheidungen am Aktienmarkt 272-97 (1979); E. Brandi,
Informationswirkungen der Jahresabschussveri6ffentlichung auf Entscheidungen am Aktienmarkt
125-71 (1977): H. Schulz, Kapitalerh~hungen aus Gesellschaftsmitteln 160-62 (1972); cf. Guy
The Behavior of Equity Securities on the German Stock Exchange, 1 J. Bank. & Fin. 71 (1977).
There appear to be no empirical tests for the Swiss stock market.
[59] For the relationship between disclosure rules and allocational efficiency in not-organized
capital markets, see, e.g., K. Hopt, supra note 29, at 51-52.
[60] With this statement, nothing is said about the portion of the total capital formation which
is allocated by external capital markets. This perspective may make the disclosure rules for
informational purposes less influential in the overall allocation of financial resources. For the
German literature, see Wagner, supra note 3, at 764-65. For the U.S., see H. Kripke, supra note
1, at 134-39.
[61] It is true that securities information is not entirely a public good because its value is
quickly exploited in the market by trading. See Manne, supra note 19, at 42-43. Yet, that is not
to say the public good perspective is flawed in the disclosure context. On one hand, there are
externalities outside the investment process because competitors of the issuers may use the data
for production decisions. See C. Benston, Corporate Financial Disclosure. supra note 16, at
141-42. On the other hand, even information for investment decisions "seldom can be confined to
a single user because many people have a motive to leak it." Coffee, supra note 1, at 725. For
characterization as a "hybrid" good see Barry, supra note 49. at 1327-28.
[62] In the disclosure context, there are two main externalities that prevent potential benefits
from being captured. The first is that investors who are not actual shareholders may use the
information for investment decisions. The second relates to the fact that other firms, particularly
competitors. may benefit from data signaling productive opportunities. See Beaver, supra note 30.
at 626-28; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 697; R. Stevenson, supra note 14, at 87.
[63] For the public good aspect, see Beaver, supra note 30, at 626-28; Easterbrook & Fischel.
supra note 1, at 680-85; Fiflis, supra note 22, at 106; Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 51. at
52-53; Mendelson, supra note 1, at 53-54; Seligman, supra note 2, at 17; R. Stevenson, supra
note 14, at 87: see also Schmidt, supra note 3, at 742. For a discussion of the related problem of
the inherent difficulties in contracting for securities research; compare Coffee, supra note 1. at
727-7.
[64] See Coffee, supra note 1, at 725-33.
[65] See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 681.
[66] See Beaver, supra note 30, at 634-36; Coffee, supra note 1, at 733-34; Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 1, at 681-82; Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 25. at 638; R. Stevenson. supra
note 14, at 87-88.
[67] W. Beaver, supra note 27, at 199. The argument of relative cost savings is also stressed in
the German literature. See Kilbler, supra note 10, at 368; F. Kilbler, supra note 9. at 89
(discussing operational efficiency).
[68] Social benefits of standardization are also mentioned in Benston, Required Periodic
Disclosure,supra note 19, at 1476; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 700-01; Longstreth.
The SEC'S Role in FinancialDisclosure, 7 J. Acct., Auditing & Fin. 110, 112 (1983).
[69] The advantages of standardized financial statements are stressed in the European literature. See, e.g., Schmidt. supra note 3, at 746-47. For the U.S. literature, see G. Benston,
Corporate Financial Disclosure, supra note 16, at 142; Fama & Laffer, Information and Capital
Markets, 44 J. Bus. 289, 298 (1971); see also Ng, An Information Economics Analysis of Financial
Reportingand External Auditing, 53 Acct. Rev. 910 (1978) (broader analysis).
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[70] See Foster, Externalities and Financial Reporting, 35 J. Fin. 521 (1980) (theoretical
discussion of externalities), For an older but still important German study of the issue, see A.
Moxter, Der Einfluss von Publizitdtsvorschriften auf das unternehmerische Verhalten (1962).
[71] G. Benston, Corporate Financial Disclosure, supra note 16, at 143. He is right in limiting
the conclusion by considering the extent to which "large, diversified corporation are able to hide
or bury information more effectively than their small, single product competitors..." Id.
[72] For a succinct description of the theory of portfolio management, see W. Beaver, supra
note 27, at 33-39; Langbein & Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Tnsts, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 72,
77-83 (1980); see also J. Lorie & M. Hamilton, supra note 48, at 171-256 (more complete
discussion).
(731 For a critical review of the SEC's disclosure concept from the portfolio management
perspective, see Kripke, supra note 1, at 91-93; Kripke, A Search for a Meaningful Securities
Disclosure Policy, 31 Bus. Law. 293, 305-07 (1975).
174] See Beaver, supra note 30, at 642-44; Beaver, supra note 15, at 46-47; cf. Seligman,
supra note 12, at 4-5 n.23; Report of the Advisory Committee, supra note 14, at XL-XLI.
[75] Coffee, supra note 1, at 747-51.
[76] Id. at 748-49.
[77] For a short description of the significance of the Beta Coefficient, see H. Kripke, supra
note 1, at 89-91.
[78] See Coffee, supra note 1, at 747-51 (for an elaborate description of the technical
arguments).
[79] See G. Benston, Corporate Financial Disclosure, supra note 16, at 137; Mendelson,
supra note 1, at 55. Other commentators speak of a "disciplining effect:' Cf. Fiflis, supra note 22,
at 93; Report of the Advisory Committee, supra note 14, at XLVI.
[80] For the American literature see Barry, supra note 49, at 1351; R. Karmel, supra note 1, at
270; Fiflis, supra note 22, at 93; Mendelson, supra note 1, at 55; Sommer, FinancialReporting
and the Stock Market: The Other Side, Fin. Executive, May 1974, at 36, 38. Similar arguments are
emphasized in the German literature. See H. Reuter, supra note 3, at 148-50, 178; Schmidt,
supra note 40, at 746. Even such an outspoken critic of disclosure regulation as Professor Benston
concedes that "there is some reason to believe that published financial data are useful to investors
to confirm what they have learned from other sources." G. Benston, Corporate Financial
Disclosure, supra note 16, at 140.
[81] Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 25, at 641; see H. Reuter, supra note 3, at 150
(describing the correction of anticipating errors as one of the essential functions of disclosure
rules).
[82] See Meier-Schatz, supra note 5, at 275 (with references to the literature). The motive
reappeared during the debate of the 1964 amendments. Cf. Seligman, supra note 2 at 51-52
(citing contemporary sources).
[83] The argument has a prominent position in the German capital market law debate. See K.
Hopt, supra note 29, at 50; Koch & Schmidt, supra note 8, at 236; F. Klcbler, supra note 10. at
368, KICbler, supra note 9, at 9; cf. H. Kronstein & C. Claussen, supra note 7, at 24 (early
statement). For the U.S. literature, see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 692-93 (criticizing
the viewpoint); Manning, Comment, in Economic Policy and the Regulation of Corporate
Securities 81, 85-87 (H. Manne ed. 1969); Seligman, supra note 21, at 562 (qualified endorsement); Seligman, supra note 2, at 51-53 (qualified endorsement).
[84] Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 693; Seligman, supra note 2, at 52-53; Koch &
Schmidt, supra note 8, at 236-37.
[85] See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text. It is significant that most critics of the
investor confidence argument believe that disclosure regulation has not been shown or may be
theoretically unable to prevent fraud. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 693; H. Kripke,
supra note 1, at 28-31; Benston, Required Disclosure, supra note 16, at 150-51. Benston has
rejected the argument empirically by comparing the purchases of new securities prior to, and after
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the enactment of. the securities acts. Value of the SECs Accounting Disclosure Requirements, 44
Acct. Rev. 515, 517-19 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Value of Accounting]. Yet. this test seems to
have serious flaws. See Becker, Coninents on "The Vale of SEC'S Accounting Disclosure
Requirements". 44 Acct. Rev. 533. 536-37 (1969). Other studies have demonstrated salutary
effects. See, e.g., Goldschmidt, Registration under the Securities Act of 1933, 4 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 19. 28 (1937).
[86] The interrelationship between investor protection and market efficiency is stressed in the
German literature. See, e.g., K. Hopt, supra note 29, at 54-55: Koch & Schmidt, supra note 8. at
237-38.
1871 See. e.g.. Corporate Governance and Directors' Liabilities (K. Hopt & G. Teubner eds.
1985) [hereinafter cited as Hopt & Teubner] (an illustrative collection of articles on various topics
of corporate governance written by both European and U.S. scholars).
188] The literature is too voluminous to be quoted. For representative statements on the
controversy, see generally Coffee. Beyond the Shut-Eved Sentiy: Toward a Theoretical View of
Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response. 63 Va. L. Rev. 1099 (1977): M. Eisenberg,
The Structure of the Corporation (1976): Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement. 35 Vand.
L. Rev. 1259 (1982); Hetherington. When the Sleeper Wakes: Reflections on Corporate Goveriance
and Shareholder Rights, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 183 (1979). For correlated German studies, compare
Bresser & Kirchner, Refornansiitze fu-r eine Venvaltungsnachtkontrolle von Grossiternelinen, 22
AG 146 (1977), with Ch.-M. Ridder-Aab, Die moderne Aktiengesellschaft im Lichte der Theorie
der Eigentumsrechte (1980). The U.S. debate has recently been intensified by an influential ALI
project. Compare Scott. Corporatton Law and the Americai Law Institute Corporate Governance
Project. 35 Stan. L. Rev. 927 (1983) with Weiss, Econiomic Analvsis, Corporate Law, and the ALI
Corporate Governance Project, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1984).
[89] For representative statements from both sides, see Loss, Disclosure as Preventive
Enforcement, in Hopt & Teubner. supra note 87, at 327, 328-30: and Bresser & Kirchner, supra
note 88, at 154-58.
[90] For a discussion of the purpose of the American proxy regulation, see E. Aranow & H.
Einhorn, Proxy Contests for Corporate Control 89-91 (2d ed. 1968); Kennedy. Prox), Regulation.
20 Bus. Law. 273, 274-75 (1965); Sowards & Mofsky, Federal Prox, Regulation: Recent Extension
of Controls. 41 St. John's L. Rev. 165, 165-67 (1966); Comment. The Pubhc Corporation - A New
Theoryfor Federal Prox' Regulation, 60 Nw. U. L. Rev. 349, 352-53 (1965). It is also universally
recognized in the European literature that disclosure is conditio sine qua non for the exercise of
shareholders' participation rights. See Beste, Aus Geschichte und Gegenwart der Publizit8it im
Aktnenwesen, in Gedenkschrift zur 150. Wiederkehr des Grundungsjahres der Friedrich-Wilhelm
Universitat zu Berlin 174, 175-76 (1960); von Caemmerer, Pubhzit5itsinteressen der Oeffentlichkeit
und Gesellschaftsrecht, in Das Frankfurter Publizitltsgespr'ch 142-56 (1962); H. Kronstein & C.
Claussen, supra note 7, at 15-18; F. Kbler, supra note 10, at 245; M. Richter, Die Sicherung der
aktienrechtlichen Publizitlt dutch ein Aktienamt 18-20 (1974) (German): R. Schindler. Die
Publizitltsvorschriften bei der Rechnungslegung der AG 24-31 (1967) (Swiss).
[91] Oft-quoted examples are mergers and offers of bonus or stock option plans. Cf. M.
Richter, supra note 90, at 18-19; A. Conard, Corporations in Perspective 296 (1976).
[92] See, e.g., Kronstein & Claussen, supra note 83, at 16: M. Richter. supra note 90. at 18:
Schindler, supra note 90, at 26-27.
[93] Cf. infra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
[94] This seems to be a common belief in the U.S. literature. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 49. at
590. ("the requirement that financial results be reported accurately has not vitalized the electoral
process"). In any event, it is surprising that there are no statements on the regulatory purpose of
providing financial statements as part of the proxy information while other disclosure items are
vigorously debated. Compare the purely formal treatment of the subject in E. Aranow & H.
Einhorn, supra note 90, at 235-37; T. Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation 324-26 (1985):
and Sowards & Mofsky. supra note 90, at 193-94. But see W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, Corporations
272 (5th ed. 1980).
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[95] See E. Aranow & I-. Einhorn, supra note 90, at 90. These disclosure items arc at the core
of the debate on the regulatory reform of board election related information. See Staff of Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., Report on Corporate
Accountability 69-95 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as SEC Staff Report]; Weiss, supra
note 49, at 591-94; Weiss & Schwartz, Using Disclosure to Activate the Board of Directors, Law &
Contemp. Probs., Summer 1977, at 63, 85-114; cf. Feis, Is ShareholderDemocraqcyAttainable?, 31
Bus. Law. 621 (1976) (reviewing several proposals to provide more open board elections).
[96] The accounting literature consequently distinguishes an "information function" and a
"distribution function" of financial disclosure rules. See A. Ciesielski, supra note 42, at 79-97; K.
Maul, supra note 42, at 46-188; A. Moxter, Bilanzlehre, supra note 42, at 51-63.
[97] See H. Kronstein & C. Claussen, supra note 83, at 16; F. Kilbler, supra note 10, at 245;
M. Richter, supra note 90, at 18; R. Schindler, supra note 90, at 28-29. It is interesting to note
that financial theorists attribute an increasingly significant weight to the distribution function as
opposed to the information function. See Schmidt, supra note 3, at 748; Schneider, supra note 3,
at 565; Wagner, supra note 3, at 765-68.
[98] See F. K-ubler, supra note 10, at 245.
[99] See supra note 60. Consider the proposal for a regulatory reform that would improve the
distribution function of disclosure rules. Wagner, stpra note 3. at 767-68. In addition to the
beneficial impact on capital markets, he stresses the importance of more effective monitoring of
management by shareholders through the use of the distribution of benefits, such as the
withholding of internal capital resources, to sanction bad management. Id.
[100] See Beste, supra note 90, at 175-76; J. Kraske, Die Publizit, tspflicht der Grossunternehmung 76 (1962); M. Richter, supra note 90, at 27-28; R. Schindler, supra note 90, at 26-27.
[1011 See Weiss, supra note 49, at 590 (skeptical view).
[102] The limits of financial statements in connection with the monitoring of management are
also generally acknowledged by the U.S. accounting literature. See, e.g., S. Davidson, C. Stickney
& R. Weil, Financial Accounting 226 (1982); G. Welsch, C. Zlatkovieh & J. White, Intermediate
Accounting 1010-11 (1976); cf. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Objectives of Financial
Reporting and Elements of Financial Statements of Business Enterprises 43-44 (1973) (hereinafter
cited as Financial Accounting Standards Board].
[103] For a description of control problems caused by the limited informational value of
financial statements, see Bresser & Kirchner, supra note 88, at 154-55; M. Richter, supra note 90,
at 28-29; see also G. Benston, Corporate Financial Disclosure, supra note 16, at 147-48
(discussing the problem in the context of the public's and employees' "right to know").
[104] See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 88, at 1263-64; Weiss, supra note 49, at 584; Werner,
Management, Stock Market and CorporateReform: Berle and Means Reconsidered, 77 Colum. L.
Rev. 388, 402-05 (1977). See also Ch,-M. Ridder-Aab, supra note 88, at 110-12 (German view).
[105] The market for corporate control was first described in the seminal article of Professor
Manne, Mergers and the Marketfor CorporateControl, 73 3. Pol. Econ. 110 (1965). In recent years,
it has been a core issue in the debate on corporate law theory. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel,
The ProperRole of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161,
1165-68 (1981); Easterbrook & Fischel, CorporateControl Transactions,91 Yale L. J. 698, 705-08
(1982); Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in
Tender Offers, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 819, 841-45 (1981). Skeptics do not question that it may have
some effectiveness as an accountability mechanism but doubt that it has sufficient disciplinary
power. See, e.g., Buxbaum, supra note 50, at 525-37; Coffee, Regulating the Marketfor Corporate
Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 Colum. L.
Rev. 1145, 1199-1200 (1984); Meier-Schatz. Managermacht und Marktkontrolle, 149 ZHR 76,
95-108 (1985) (European view).
[106] See supra notes 48-60 and accompanying text.
[107] See Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25
UCLA L. Rev. 738, 790 (1978); Weiss, supra note 49, at 589.
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[108] Professor Coffee stresses that a mandatory disclosure system alleviates the problem
because it may subsidize the search costs of bidders and activate some degree of shareholder
activity. See Coffee, supra note 1, at 747.
[109) The fact that low stock prices and the related threat of takeovers can have a disciplinary
effect on management has been increasingly recognized. See. e.g., Grossfeld. Zur Stellng des
Kleinaktionars ins Wirtschaftss.stem, 30 AG 1. 4-5 (1985): Wagner. supra note 3. at 764: cf.
Meicr-Schatz, supra note 105. at 93-103. Meier-Schatz. Unternehmenszusammenshlosse mittels
ubernahmeangebot. 38 Wirtschaft und Recht (1986) (forthcoming); Ridder-Aab, supra note 88. at
112-25.
(110] For a recent restatement of the distinction between the monitoring for performance and
loyalty in legal as well as in economic terms, see Brudney, Corporate Governance. Agencr Costs.
and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1403, 1430-42 (1985).
[1l1] Cf. Meier-Schatz, supra note 5, at 283.
[1121 See id. at 275-76 (referring to the relevant literature).
[1131 See Gessler, Der Bedeutungswandel der Rechnungslegung in Aktienrecht. 75 Jahre Deutsche Treuhand-Gesellschaft 1890-1965. 129, 163 (1965): K. Maul, supra note 42, at 3-17: F.
Oesch, Der Minderheitenschutz im Konzern nach schweizerischem und amerikanischem Recht
197-98 (1971): R. Ott, Unternehmenspublizitft. Analyse eines Rechts und wirtschaftsinstruments
64-66 (1973).
[114] Disloyal or illegal behavior, however, rarely leads to negative financial consequences
which, because of its extent, shows itself directly in financial statements. This has been widely
recognized and discussed in connection with the "materiality" standard of disclosure in the SEC's
"questionable payments" campaign. See. e.g.. Comment. Disclosureof Corporate Pawnents Abroad
and the Concept of Materiality, 4 Hofstra L. Rev. 729 (1976): Note, Disclosure of Corporate
Paviments aiid Practices: Conduct Regulation through the Federal Securities Laws, 43 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 681 (1977).
[1151 See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
[1 161 It is also doubtful whether financial disclosure requirements can impede insider trading.
See G. Benston. Corporate Financial Disclosure, supra note 16. at 122. But see Brudney, supra
note 41, at 335.
[117] For an overview of U.S. jurisdiction and rules concerning management integrity disclosure, see generally Longstreth. supra note 68: Steinberg, Corporate Internal Affairs 73-132
(1983).
[118] This deficiency of the market mechanism is generally recognized. See Coffee, supra note
105, at 1201-02; Scott, supra note 88, at 938-39: Werner, supra note 104, at 441. But see Gilson.
supra note 105, at 840.
[119] See Meier-Schatz, supra note 5. at 276-81, 287 (reviewing the U.S. and German
literature).
[120] See id. at 284. 287 (reviewing the U.S. and German literature).
[121] This formula does not mean that broader public policy considerations have no independent and autonomous value wtthin investor, shareholder, or capital market founded disclosure
schemes. The issue is discussed only as to whether they are necessan, to ensure that all larger
enterprises are covered by the mandatory disclosure scheme.
[122] See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1982). (I do not consider in
this context the special section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act.)
[123] This is not directly evident for the second of the mentioned criteria. But because the
modest asset requirement is almost meaningless, the key is the shareholder figure element. Here
the legislative history of the 1964 amendments reveals that it was thought to have a direct
relationship to the corporation's position in the over-the-counter market. See. e.g.. Comment,
supra note 90. at 362-65 (citing the influential Report of Special Study of Securities Markets). See
generally Meeker, Extending Dtsclosure to Nonlisted Conspanies, 20 Bus. Law. 265 (1965):
Sowards, The Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, New Registration and Reporting Requirements,
19 U. Miami L. Rev. 33 (1964).
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[124] One should recall, however, that there are some privately held U.S. corporations which
rank among the largest and which are under no duty to disclose financial information. See R.
Stevenson, supra note 14, at 185. Their number may grow if the current trend of "going private."
in particular by management buyouts. continues. For a general analysis of the phenomenon. see
Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 730 (1985).
[125] See Meier-Schatz, supra note 5, at 276-78 (historical presentation).
[126] See id. at 278.
[127] See Castan, Publizitatspflichtfir alle Grossunternehnen?,21 Der Betrieb [DB] 515, 518
(1968). Many larger enterprises seem to have intentionally evaded mandatory disclosure rules by
choosing another legal form. See Rittner, Reclunigslegungs-Publi:ittfir Grossunternehinen, 99
Juristische Blitter 393, 394-95 (1977).
[128] For the motives behind the Publicity Law, see Rittner, supra note 127, at 394-95.
[129] Most of the large enterprises not incorporated as stock corporations were companies
with limited liability having no freely transferable shares or limited partnerships. See Castan,
supra note 127, at 278-79.
[130] See Meier-Schatz, supra note 5, at 278-79.
[131] Newer statistical figures are presented in Botschaft iUber die Revision des Aktienrechts
3-12 (1983).
[1321 See Meier-Schatz, supra note 5, at 280-81.
[133] This is true because such a reform would cover small corporations as well.
[134] Even advocates of a broader public policy concept recognize that it has no particular
significance when the information is provided by capital market or stock company disclosure
rules. See F. Schwark, Anlegerschutz durch Wirtschaftsrecht 179 (1979).
[1351 G. Benston, Corporate Financial Disclosure, supra note 16, at 147-48.
[136] The situation is entirely different with respet to non-financial, in particular social
responsibility disclosure.
[137] See G. Benston, Corporate Financial Disclosure, supra note 16, at 147-48.
[138] See itfra text accompanying notes 141-51.
[139] See generally Meier-Schatz, supra note 5. at 278-79.
[140] See. e.g., F. Kibler, supra note 10, at 246; cf. Pruhs, Der Regierungsenzwurf emes
Publiziitsgesetzes 14 AG 173, 218-22 (1969) (more elaborate discussion). Early promotors of a
broader public policy concept of disclosure on the whole listed the same disclosure items that were
already regulated in the stock company laws. See B. Boetcher, Unternehmensverfassung als
gesellschaftspolitische Forderung 197-99 (1968); Kunze, Die Publizitdt des Grossunternehmnens, in
Festschrift far 0. von Nell-Breuning 292, 319-20 (1965); P. van Ommeslaghe, Le r6gime des
sociat~s par actions et leur administration en droit compar6 568 (1960).
[141] R. Huhs, Die Funktion der Wffentlichen Rechnungslegung 163-67 (1973); H. Kronstein
& C. Claussen, supra note 7, at 22; R. Ott, supra note 113, at 92-98; Rittner, Die handeisrechtlide Publizitlit ausserhalb der Aktiengesellschaft, Gutachten Jur den, 46 DJT 141-42 (1964) G.
Scherrer, Die Ausweitung der Rechnungslegungspublizit-t auf alle Grossunternehmen 162-76
(1968); Schilling, Publizitt,Aktienrechtsreform und Unternehnensrecht,46 DB 1497, 1498 (1962);
R. Tschfdni, Funktionswandel des Gesellschaftsrechts 196 (1978).
[142] See Hubs, supra note 141, at 170-71; H. Kronstein & C. Claussen, supra note 7,at
22-23; Rittner, supra note 147, at 142-43; G. Scherrer, supra note 141, at 162-63.
[143] See Huls, supra note 141, at 167-69; P. van Ommeslaghe. supra note 140, at 267-71;
R. Ott, supra note 113, at 94-96, Rittner, supra note 141, at 141-42; G. Scherrer, supra note 141,
at 167-76; R. Tsch.ni, supra note 141, at 196-97.
[144] The mediation and transformation of corporate data by the mass media and other
representatives of public opinion is widely noted. See Rittner, supra note 141, at 141; G.
Scherrer, supra note 141, at 165-66; Schilling, supra note 141, at 1498.
[145] Cf. Bresser & Kirchner, supra note 88, at 154.
[146] See generally id.; C. Ott, Recht und Realiffit der Unternehmenskorporation 183 (1977).
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[147] For similarly skeptical statements, see Kriger, Oeffenthche Eleienreder Unternehnensverfassung, in Planung V 19,44 (1971): H. Steinmann, Das Grossunternehmen im Interessenkonflikt 191-92 (1969): and Schilling, supra note 141, at 1498. But see R. Huhs. supra note 141. at
168-69: J. Kraske, supra note 100, at 69: P. van Ommeslaghe. supra note 140, at 567: R. Ott.
supra note 113, at 94-95. The reservations remain valid with respect to the argument that
disclosure rules serve the purpose of demonstrating to the public the existence of an internal
control. See Wietholter, Das PubhitiitsinteressederAnteilseigner. in Das Frankfurter Publizitatsgesprach 33, 48-54 (1962). As far as disclosure is only a documentary demonstration, it is not an
external control device. As far as it is meant to trigger external monitoring activities, the problem
of its effectiveness remains.
[148] It is clear that the mechanism of politicizing corporations is not the same for economic,
ab opposed to social, performance. See Stevenson, The Corporation as a Political Institution. 8
Hofstra L. Rev. 39, 45-51 (1979).
[1491 See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text. Some commentators believe that
disclosure rules benefit the general public because they reduce the danger of corporate insolvencies. See. e.g.. R. Ott, supra note 113, at 96-97; G. Scherrer, supra note 141. at 28-36. This
argument is discussed infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
[150] See supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
[151] It is still widely held that financial disclosure requirements deter questionable practices
in the interest of the general public. See. e.g.. R. Huhs. supra note 141. at 169; P. van
Ommeslaghe, supra note 140, at 267; G. Scherrer, supra note 141, at 118.
[152] The argument of creditor protection was stressed throughout the legislative history of the
stock company laws. See generall Meier-Sehatz. supra note 5. at 276-81. Employee-related
aspects appeared particularly in connection with the "enterprise law" debate. See 1d. at 287.
[153] Promotors of creditor related disclosure motives are, for example, von Caemmerer. supra
note 90, at 158-59; R. Huhs. supra note 141, at 141-58. F. Kiibler. supra note 10. at 248: M.
Richter, supra note 90, at 20-22: G. Scherrer, supra note 141. at 137-52. Critics include R. Ott,
supra note 113, at 74-79; Rittner, supra note 127, at 155-56; Schwark, Problenme der Unternehnienspublizitt im Lichte der 4. und 7. Gesellschaftsrechtlichen EG-Richtlinten, 23 AG 269. 271-72
(1978); cf. R. Schindler. supra note 90, at 50-51. The issue has been intensively discussed in
connection with the reform proposals for a new German law affecting companies with limited
liability. See also R. Huhs, supra note 141, at 141-43: cf. Hoffman, Rechnungslegung lid ihire
Publizttt im Regieningsen wurf eines GMBH-Gesetzes inz Hinblick auf die Rechisentwickhng in der
EWG, in Festschrift fOr H. Kaufmann 213, 225-27 (1972) (citing relevant literature). The question
has lately become important with respect to the Fourth Directive, which requires mandatory rules
for companies with limited liability. These rules can, aside from public policy considerations
concerning large business entities, only be legitimized by the argument of creditor protection.
[154] See von Caemmerer. supra note 90, at 158-59: F. Kubler. supra note 10, at 248: M.
Richter, supra note 90. at 20-22.
[155] See R. Huhs, supra note 141. at 156-58: J. Kraske, supra note 100. at 105-07: G.
Scherrer, supra note 141, at 150-52.
[156] The argument was advanced early on by critics concerned with having mandatory
disclosure rules for companies with limited liability. See, e.g., H. Fassbender, Grfindung und
Publizitlt bei iner Reform der Gesellschaft mit beschr-nkter Haftung 73 (1961): Kbhler, Zur
Pflichtpritfung und Publizittspflicht der Geseltschaften nibH, 47 Rundschau fOr GmbH 113, 115
(1956), cf. Wilrdinger. Zur Publizutit der GnmbH tm nationalen und europiischen Bereich. 55
GmbH-Rundschau 151, 154 (1964) (criticizing a different treatment of larger and small companies
for reasons of consistency).
[157] For more details on the specific informational needs of creditors, see L. Bernstein.
Analysis of Financial Statements 2-4 (1984): Financial Accounting Standards Board, supra note
102, at 10-12; W. Kenley & G. Staubus. Objectives and Concepts of Financial Statements 46-48
(1972). For the German literature, see R. Huhs, supra note 141, at 157-58: K. Maul. supra note
42, at 25-26.
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[158] See supra note 154; Castan, supra note 127, at 516. There are, however, commentators
who doubt that creditor oriented disclosure rules may attain even their informational purposes.
See, e.g., Rittner, supra note 127, at 155-56; Rittner, supra note 127, at 399: Schwark, supra note
153, at 271-72.
[159] Some creditors may overreact and thereby even promote insolvencies. See Strobel,
Publizitdispflidt und Haftungsbeschrilnkung, 36 BB 1762, 1749-50 (1981). In addition, large
creditors with individual inspection rights have informational advantages as compared with small
creditors who depend on mandatory financial disclosure.
[160] The crucial issue in this context is the well known question of whether financial ratios
compiled from financial statements can predict corporate failure or bankruptcy. There is a
considerable body of empirical research studies on this subject. Cf. Scott, The Probabilio of
Bankruptcy"A Comparison of EntpiricalPredictionsand TheoreticalModels, J. Bank. & Fin., Sept.
1981, 317-44; G. Gebhardt, Insolvenzprognosen aus aktienrechtlichen Jahresabsehlissen (1980).
These results, however, do not change the fact that the prediction of bankruptcy on the basis of
financial statements faces substantial structural limitations. For U.S. accounting literature, see S.
Davidson, C. Stickney & R. \Veil, supra note 102, at 224-25; D. Hawkins, Corporate Financial
Reporting 10 (1977); 1. Spiller, Financial Accounting 643 (1977). A particularly illuminating
analysis can be found in the German treatise, of 1 A. Moxter. Bilanzlehre, at 86-91 (1984).
1161] For supporting statements, see Castan, supra 127, at 516-17; R. Huhs, supra note 141,
at 120-41; M. Richter, supra note 90, at 22-24; Schwark, supra note 153, at 271. For a skeptical
evaluation, see Kraske, supra note 100, at 78-85; Ott, supra note 113, at 79-81.
[162] The argument often uses the principle of equal rights of shareholders and workers to
legitimize itself. See C. Benston, Corporate Financial Disclosure, supra note 16, at 148 (questioning the principle); Kraske, supra note 100, at 78; M. Richter, supra note 90, at 22; cf. R. Huhs,
supra note 141, at 129-33 (referring to principles of democracy and human rights).
[163] See, e.g., Ott, supra note 113, at 80.
[164] See F. Kilbler, supra note 10, at 248. The majority of commentators hold that financial
disclosure rules for employees have not become superfluous because of the codetermination law.
See Castan, supra note 127, at 516-17; Hubs, supra note 141, at 133-41; M. Richter, supra note
90, at 23-24; Schwark, supra note 153, at 271.
[165] See Scherrer, supra note 141, at 137.
[166] It does not follow that a labor related objective for financial disclosure rules has no
independent and autonomous value even though the rules primarily address investors and
shareholders.
[167] The situation is obviously different with respect to social responsibility disclosure, e.g.,
information about workplace safety.
[1681 See Maunders, Employee Reporting, in Developments in Financial Reporting 171,
176-80 (T. Lee ed. 1981) (comparison between investors' and employees' informational demands
for financial data). One important disclaimer has to be made: while investors are mainly
interested in financial information about the corporation as a legal entity, employees often need
disaggregated data based on their individual plant. See, e.g., Cooper & Essex, Accounting
Information and Employee Decision Making, 2 Ac. Org. & Soc. 201, 210 (1977).
[169] See supra note 161.
[170] This aspect is emphasized particularly in the Swiss literature. See Dober, Die Publizitldt
der Unternehnzen-Publizittsempfdngerund Publizitdtstrager, 37 SAG 105, 108-09 (1965); R.
Schindler, supra note 90, at 57-58.
[171] See R. Hubs, supra note 141, at 141; R. Ott, supra note 113, at 79; M. Richter, supra
note 90, at 22; Scherrer, supra note 141, at 135-36.
[172] G. Benston, Corporate Financial Disclosure, supra note 16, at 148.
[1731 See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
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